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There is nothing novel in the assertion that the process by which policies are
formulated in the American system of government is a complex one. Yet acknowl-
edgment of this fact of complexity is a necessary starting point in any meaningful
attempt to describe and evaluate the relations of the President and Congress to the
regulatory process, and the extent to which they provide effective guidance and
control of the development of regulatory policies.' The reasons for complexity are
well-known: they derive not only from the magnitude and difficulty of many of
the policies themselves, but also from the social and economic characteristics of
America and from the political and governmental institutions through which policies
are evolved. As a reminder of these latter conditions, one need only mention the
diversity of interests that characterizes our society; the freedom afforded such interests
to organize and express their wishes politically; the resulting play of competing
forces upon and within our political parties and governmental institutions; and
the built-in separation and competition within government itself, with domination-
or even leadership--guaranteed to neither President nor Congress and with neither
branch assured of unity of purpose or operations.
The implications of such complexity for the role of President and Congress are
clear. In the first place, the assignment of responsibility for the actions of govern-
ment, whether of a regulatory or nonregulatory nature, is difficult. To say that the
President and Congress-either singly or jointly-are the agents for the development
and ultimate control of policies is frequently only the beginning of analysis and
description. A more realistic description would require, for example, at least an
analysis of the political programs and movements of relevant interest groups for
whom both the President and Congress are but agents or spokesmen.?
But accepting for symbolic and practical reasons the primary role of President and
Congress in the policy-making process, we must emphasize that theirs is a shared
and overlapping and, not infrequently, a conflicting responsibility. While by no
means a novel point, this is a factor that is too frequently ignored by those con-
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'See, e.g., an analysis of this type in DAVID B. TRu AN, , THE GovERNMETrrL. PRocEss passim (1958).
' LAWRENCE H. CHAaaEstLAIN, THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS AND LEGISLATION 448-64 (1946).
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demning both the substance of regulatory programs and the organizational forms
employed to administer them. To stress the practice of shared responsibility,
however, is not to insist upon an invariable pattern, nor to contend that such sharing
is equally applicable to all types or levels of regulatory policy-making. There are
instances in which Congress, for example, as compared with the President, bears
almost sole responsibility for new regulatory schemes. 4 In addition, a distinction
must be made between the responsibility of the President in the initiation of policy
for statutory enactment, where traditionally he has played a significant role, and his
responsibility for subsequent development of administrative policies under the
statutes, where for reasons to be mentioned later his role has been far less important.
In reaction to the fact of complexity and the diffusion of responsibility that
accompanies it, there has developed the tendency of presidential "aggrandizement,"
to use the term of Professor Corwin, or the assumption by the President from time
to time of a position of leadership vis-a-vis the Congress for the purpose of effecting
new regulatory programs.5 There is only a seeming contradiction between such
presidential initiative and the pattern of shared responsibility between the two
political branches. The presidential role is one only of leadership and not of
domination or of a displacement of the Congress. Further, the role is not con-
tinuously played by the President or always effective when attempted. Regardless
of the uneven application of such leadership, however, its growth over the course
of the nation's history is among the more well-known aspects of executive-
legislative relations. It is generally conceded to have resulted both from the greater
political leadership potential of the unified presidential office and from a relative
lack of such potential in the dispersed political and organizational form of the
Congress.0
Another aspect of this same reaction to the dispersion of political authority and
to the complexity within the policy process has been a realization of the need of
some degree of coordination and control above the operating agency level of the
administrative phase of policy development. Both President and Congress have
been recognized as agents for achieving such goals. But once again, at least in the
literature and recommendations of specialists concerned with administrative re-
organization, the President has generally been considered more capable of effecting
coordination and exercising those controls that are necessary for achieving political
responsibility of administration in a democratic society.7 Accomplishments along
this line, however, while not insignificant when viewed from the total perspective
of the entire executive branch of government, have admittedly been quite limited
with regard to regulatory administration, particularly in view of the prominent role
' id. at 451.
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played by independent boards and commissions in the execution of regulatory pro-
grams. Yet the need of some type of overhead control and coordination is still
recognized, even by those who are partisans of the independent agencies 8
A final relevant characteristic of the complexity in the political process is that
the Congress, so organized as richly to express the diverse interests that compose
it, continues to play a forceful role in the initial declaration of regulatory policies
as well as in subsequent attempts to shape the content of programs developed by
administrators under the statutes. In the latter aspect of its role, the Congress is
assisted greatly by the "independent" character of the regulatory commissions that
it considers, perhaps inconsistently, "arms of the Congress" and over which it
jealously exercises "legislative oversight."
I
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT
In analyzing and evaluating the responsibility of the President for the develop-
ment and control of regulatory policies, at least two sets of distinctions should be
kept in mind: first, that between the role of the President as formulator (or advocate)
of policies for enactment by the Congress, and that as developer of administrative
policies under terms of basic regulatory legislation; and second, the distinction
between the President and his staffs of personal assistants and advisers, and the
"Presidency," meaning in effect the executive establishment theoretically under
control of the chief executive. Obviously, both sets of distinctions are somewhat
artificially drawn and should not be thought to represent more than broad categories
to facilitate clarity of analysis. Moreover, further refinements properly could be
drawn so as to distinguish different aspects of some of the roles here noted. For
example, analysis of the role of the President as developer of administrative policies
might well take into account, on the one hand, the President's relations with a single
regulatory agency or program in which, by virtue of specific statutory provisions, he
is permitted to intervene; 9 and on the other, those relations with several agencies
whose policies, in the President's view, require a degree of coordination. While
such refinements have pertinence for later portions of this article, attention at this
point will center upon the two sets of broad distinctions noted above.
A. Formulator of Statutory Policies
The history of regulatory policy development in the national government is
replete with illustrations of the energetic and successful role played by the President
in formulating and advocating policies for enactment by the Congress.1° It is mainly
this function we have in mind when we speak of the President as "chief legislator."
Such responsibility is derived not only from constitutional provisions, but also, and
8JAmES M. LANDis, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEss 24, 30 (1938).
'An example is his authority in foreign or overseas air route certification by the CAB. 72 Stat. 782,
49 U.S.C. § 1463 (1958).1
o CHm-ata-ur, op. cit. supra note 3, passim.
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more importantly, from the position of political leadership that he occupies. In this
latter capacity, he is spokesman for political interests and groups whose policy
objectives, without presidential support, might otherwise be blocked by opponents
in the Congress. This policy-forming role of the President, especially as it relates
to a particular proposal, is apt to be transitory in nature, however, lasting only so
long as political backing exists and the limited time and energy of the President
permits." Its more dramatic and noticeable instances are associated with broad and
significant innovations in the law, although regulatory statutes of narrow and less
important character are known to have resulted from, or been influenced by, presi-
dential recommendation.' 2
B. Developer of Administrative Policies
In the development of administrative policies, however, the President has not
enjoyed such influence. Theoretically at least, the case should perhaps be otherwise,
particularly in view of constitutional prescriptions that seem to invest him with the
executive power of the government.'3 And in reality, certain factors do enable
the President to influence the administrative formulation of regulatory policies:
his authority to appoint and, under certain conditions, to remove key officials; his
power to designate the chairman of most of the independent commissions; his
ability in some instances to review and approve administrative decisions; his control
over administrative budgets;' 4 and, to paraphrase the views earlier expressed by
James M. Landis, "the over-shadowing stature of the President in matters of
policy" that enables his view to prevail in a showdown with competing administrative
agents.'
Despite these sources of strength, however, the President's role in administrative
policy formation is severely limited. (Examples to the contrary are frequently drawn
from periods of war and other disaster and, therefore, are not entirely appropriate
indications of presidential potential in the absence of emergency.)"' There are
several immediate reasons for this limited role. Statutory provisions not infrequently
place primary or sole authority in officials other than the President, although such
officials are members of executive departments traditionally considered subject to
" TRumAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 398-404.
"For an estimate of the comparative influence of President and Congress on specific statutes enacted
during this century, see CHwmuAms, op. cit. supra note 3, at 450-52.
" U.S. CoNST. art. I. For an extensive treatment of the ambiguities that surround the meaning of the
executive power in the Constitution, see CoRwiN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 69-169. Professor Truman
refers to the "magnificent ambiguities" concerning the President's constitutional role as "chief executive."
TRumAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 401.
"These and other factors providing a basis for presidential influence of the independent regulatory
agencies are discussed in EmM rrE S. REDFoRD, ADMINISTRATON oF NATiONAL EcoNosic CoNTnOL 277-83
(1952). Professor Redford concludes: "Plainly, there is a conflict of trends on the independence of the
regulatory commission. Presidential power bucks tradition. Facts run counter to the theory that the
commissions are 'wholly free from control by the President.'" Id. at 283.
"Note James M. Landis's comment to that effect in Administratioe Process and Ethical Questions,
Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight of the Hotuce Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 85 th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1958).16 Sturm, Emergencies and the Presidency, in RA4msx, op. cit. supra note 5, at 121.
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presidential direction.17 An even more basic reason is Congress' practice of placing
regulatory programs in organizations relatively free of the President's authority-
that is, in the independent regulatory commissions.'" Moreover, opportunity for
intervention by the President into administrative policy formation is limited by pro-
cedural requirements designed to guarantee due process to persons subject to the
law. An example of such requirements is the practice, either prescribed by statute or
sanctioned by custom, of determining administrative policies by judicial-like, "on-
the-record" proceedings.j' Such proceedings are used particularly, although by no
means exclusively, by the independent regulatory commissions for policy develop-
ment and are frequently severely criticized by many students as obstacles not only
to planning and timely policy formulation by the commissions, but also to necessary
policy direction and coordination by the President.2°
C. President and the "Presidency"
But a more fundamental reason is found in the complexity of the American
political environment, to which we have previously referred, and the resulting
diffusion of power within the structure of the executive branch of government that
the President nominally heads. Political scientists and students of public administra-
tion in recent times have taken an optimistic view of the potentialities of presidential
control of administration and have advocated structural and other changes to secure
an integrated, coordinated approach toward policy development.2 ' They rightly
stress the institutional character of much presidential decision-making and the
resulting need of certain administrative arrangements to facilitate the securing of
timely, consistent, and responsible decisions. With such arrangements, they
suggest, the gap between the President and the executive branch can be narrowed,
2 "... there is not too great a difference between the allegedly 'independent' agencies and those
technically a part of some Executive Department. The President's arbitrary interference with the
operations of the Commodity Exchange Administration would be subject to resentment equal to that
engendered by a similar interference with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The same would
hold whether it involved Food and Drug Administration or the Federal Trade Commission." JAMES
M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECr 30 (1960) [this report has been
published as a committee print by the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (ig6o); it is hereinafter cited as LANDIS
REPORT].
"8 MARVER H. BERNSTIN, REGULATING BUSINESS By INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 127-63 (1955). See
also REDFORD, op. cit. supra note 14, at 275-76.
"
5 The prevalence of a judicial-like approach to decision-making in the agencies, particularly as it
affects the ability of the President to play a role in policy formulation, raises, as is noted more fully
in latter portions of this article, the question of separation of functions in regulatory administration.
If decisions are to be reached on the basis of facts set forth "on the record" by methods typical of courts,
then, the question is asked, how can the President be permitted to influence the decision without destroying
the judicial character of the process? One answer, of course, has been to separate completely the planning
and rule-making duties of an agency from its judicial duties, thereby enabling the President to intervene
in the performance of the first but not the latter duties. The obvious inference of this proposal is that such
separation can be made without seriously crippling the administration of the law. But see infra notes
215-23.
" BERNSTEIN, Op. cit. supra note 18, at 179-82.
"PREsIDENT's Coiim. ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNrrED STATES passim (1937). The Committee was composed of three well-
known political scientists and/or students of administration.
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if not closed, and the symbolic role of presidential leadership, authority, and responsi-
bility for policy formation can be made a reality. Yet the complex and diffused
character of political power, mentioned above, produces a major distinction between
the President and the "Presidency," or between the President as a powerful but
nonetheless politically limited occupant of the executive office and the executive
establishment that he heads. Professor Corwin tells us that the entire history of
the presidential office has been one of aggrandizement 2 Moreover, the last several
decades record a continuing and on-the-whole successful effort to make the President
a more effective chief executive.23  But the growth of power and effectiveness is a
relative matter and must be measured not only against the weaker and less effective
conditions of the past, but also against the obstacles of the present. A realistic
appraisal of current conditions will show that a significant obstacle is the diffusion of
power within the executive branch of government itself, the effect of which is to
create an important gap between the President and the many executive departments
and agencies that mere organizational and management improvements cannot fully
close.24 The "Presidency"-so frequently used in an almost unthinking way as a
substitute term for the President-is, in reality, a great mass of people and agencies
that, in organizational form, has only a partial resemblance to the unity of the
presidential office. As a consequence, men theoretically responsible to the President
are free at times to recommend and develop policies either beyond the concern
or knowledge of the chief executive or in direct contradiction of expressed presi-
dential views. In this regard, the executive branch displays many of the separatist
characteristics of the Congress, and for the same reasons. Of course, the point
must not be carried too far; but at least it must be acknowledged. Otherwise we
may expect too much of the President not only as formulator of policies for enact-
ment by the Congress, but more importantly for our purposes here, as developer of
administrative regulatory programs.
II
EXECUTIVE INTEGRATION AND INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES
Much of the foregoing description of the President's role in administrative regu-
lation can be illustrated through a brief review of proposals and efforts in the
last twenty-five years to integrate the independent regulatory agencies into executive
departments.
A. Meaning and Goals of Executive Integration
The idea of executive integration of administration has occupied an important
place in both the literature and practice of American government throughout this
2 CoRwzN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 29-30.
a A similar judgment is expressed by Fritz Morstein Marx elsewhere in this symposium. See Mor-
stein Marx, Administrative Regulation in Comparative Perspective, infra at 307, 313-14.
"* Long, Power and Administration, 9 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 257 (1949).
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century. In fact, it is possible to speak of an "integrationist movement" operating
on all levels of government: the establishment of strong-mayor and city-manager
systems in municipal government; state government reorganizations resulting in
increased authority of the governor over administrative operations; and the con-
tinuing efforts to alter the structure of national administration to bring about a
more rationalized organization under control of the President. All of these
movements are indicative of the prominence-and, to some extent, the persuasive-
ness--of the integrationist concept in recent decades.
The meaning of integration is suggested, perhaps somewhat formally, in terms
of the following requirements.2 0 In the first place, authority for the direction
of administration should be concentrated in the hands of the elective chief executive.
Secondly, similar functions should be grouped in the same departments or agencies
in order to promote consistency and reduce overlapping and waste in the applica-
tion of the law. Third, each of the departments should be headed by a person
appointed by, and responsible to, the chief executive, who delegates a portion of
his authority to each department head. Fourth, to facilitate effective control of
his subordinates and all administrative operations, the chief executive should have
a relatively narrow "span of control"--that is, he should attempt to supervise the
activities of as few subordinates as possible. Therefore, the number of department
heads directly responsible to the chief executive should be kept to a minimum
feasible with effective operations. As a fifth requirement, the chief executive
should have at his disposal certain necessary facilitative powers and staff assistance
in order that he might be the chief administrator in fact as well as in name; for
example, powers and staff aids in the areas of budget, planning, and personnel.
Sixth, the chief executive alone should be considered the responsible agent and
spokesman of administration, and consequently he, rather than his subordinates
within the integrated structure, should be held accountable to the legislature (and
the people) for the conduct of administration. Implicit in this requirement is the
assumption that the legitimate functions of both the executive, in directing the
administration of the law, and the legislature, in seeing that the law is responsibly
administered, will be best achieved if each approaches the other through its leader-
ship on a relatively unified, nonpiecemeal basis. This in turn assumes (or posits
as necessary or helpful), in addition to integration of the executive branch, the
existence of a fairly high degree of legislative integration, with resulting strength
in its leadership and relative weakness in its subunits of organization, such as
committees and their chairmen. A final requirement of particular importance for
our purposes here is that much of the substantive policy to be followed by depart-
ments and agencies should be determined by the chief executive, or, at least,
"
5 A brief account of the history of American public administration, including the role of the chief
executive, is presented in LEoNARD D. WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
13-60 (I955).
"For a description of the "integrationist model," see JOHu M. PFIFFNER & RoEr V. PRESrsUS,
PUBLIC AmwissTprouN 197-213 (I960).
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formulated in his name. Two considerations support this requirement. First is
the fact that administration, far from being concerned merely with the simple,
and neutral, application of policies already clearly determined by the legislature, is
itself intimately involved in the formulation of policies under the basic statutes2
And second is the requirement previously mentioned, that in an integrated admin-
istration, authority is vested in the chief executive. Since this is the case, he should
be empowered to determine the substance of administrative policies under authority
of controlling legislation. One practical consequence of this requirement is to
deny the legislature the privilege of placing final authority for administering the
laws in the hands of officials subordinate to the chief executive or in organizations
independent of his control. One possible exception to the requirement, however,
and an important one as we shall explain more extensively below, concerns policies
affecting individual rights determined by judicial-like processes.
Executive integration is desirable, according to its exponents, on several grounds.
Increased economy and efficiency in administrative operations almost always figure
prominently in the reasons offered for a more integrated structure of government.2 s
Such results, however, are frequently difficult to prove and often appear as little more
than ways of attracting support of tax-wary electorates and legislators for reorgani-
zation proposals. The really basic reasons for integration are twofold: more effective
responsibility on the part of administrators, and greater consistency and vigor in
administrative policy development 9 The achievement of each of these goals, it is
said, is dependent mainly upon the ability of political leaders of administration to
reflect broad public interests and to muster political power sufficient to exact from
administrators programs that are consonant with such interests. Integration of the
executive branch under the broadly representative and politically powerful position
of the elected chief executive is believed to satisfy these requirements. In the
national government, for example, the President is considered the most representa-
tive agent of the American people. Consequently, he is supposedly capable of taking
a broad, rather than a narrow or particularistic, view of governmental policies and
of achieving the coordination of administration that is the requisite of consistent
programs. Moreover, by virtue of his broad political support, he theoretically also
possesses the power necessary to hold subordinates accountable to the policies that
he formulates in the public interestf0
rFriedrich, Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility, in C. J. FmEDCH &
EDWARD S. MASoN (Ens.), PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1940).
"s Not all government reorganizations are undertaken to provide greater integration of the structure
and operations of administration; but practically all are justified in terms of economy and/or efficiency.
Yet, during this century, reorganization efforts frequently have been guided, in part at least, by the
"principles" of integration; when that was so, then integration was another means of achieving economy
and/or efficiency. Note, for example, the heavy emphasis placed upon these goals in the reports of the
first Hoover Commission. See CO.MtM?'N o ORGAN1zATION OF THE ExEctrivE BRANCH or THE GoVERN-
MENT, CONCLUDING REPORT passim (1949).
" PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, op. cit., supra note 21, at 3, 29, 30, 36-37,
41.
80 Ibid.
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B. Independent Commissions and the Failure of Integration
We have previously acknowledged that the integrationist concept has not been
without influence in the executive branch of the national government. Measured
strictly by all of the requirements noted above, the results perhaps have not been
great; at least one is still impressed with the "disintegrated" character of the
national administration. Yet numerous studies and investigations conducted in
recent decades have had that concept as their standard,"1 and certain changes in
organizational structure and improvements in management techniques, particularly
in the creation of more effective staff assistance for the President, are indicative
of the impact of some of the so-called "principles" of integration. Greatest resist-
ance to integrationist claims has come, perhaps, in the area of regulatory administra-
tion. Long and continued reliance upon the independent boards and commissions
for major regulatory tasks is the most obvious indication of such resistance. In
fact, in the late i93o's, when the case for executive integration of the national admin-
istration received its most classic statement, 2 some opponents claimed that the
integrationist movement centered "around questions concerning the organization,
the relationship, the functions, and the control over the actions of independent
regulatory boards and commissions."33  The effects of the movement upon the
regulatory commissions at that time were virtually nil, however, and subsequent
reorganization studies until recent months either by-passed the issue or found
positive reasons for continuing the commissions3 4 And although various factors
in the relations between the President and the regulatory agencies have had the
effect, over the years, of reducing the degree of agency independence of the chief
executive,3 ' the commissions remain today as primary examples of a disintegrated
national administration.
The fact that "independence" of the regulatory commissions has consisted pri-
marily of freedom from presidential control (rather than from control by Congress
or clientele groups)36 is perhaps enough to explain the concern that they create
for proponents of executive integration. In their view, such freedom means the
denial of those basic goals of integration that were mentioned above-namely,
"1 Concerning the impact of the integration concept, Professor Fesler has said: "[T]his ideal structure
continues to command the respect of all official commissions and committees that have made major
investigations of the administrative . . . needs of national, state, and municipal governments." Fesler,
Administrative Literature and the Second Hoover Commission Reports, 51 AM. PoL. Sc. REV. 135-36
(1957), quoted in PPiFFNER & PR.Srssus, op. cit. supra note 26, at 198.
"
2 Namely, PRESIDENT'S CoMMa. ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, Op. Cit. supra note 21.
" FREDERICK F. BLACHLY & MIRIAM E. OATMAN, FEDERAL REGULATORY ACTION AND CONTROL 143
(940).
4 Examples of generally favorable responses to the independent commissions by official reorganization
study groups may be found in the reports of the first Hoover Commission and its task force on regulatory
commissions. CoMT'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE ExECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, REGULATORY
COMeMIssIONs passim (1949), and TAsK FORCE REPORT ON REGULATORY CoMMISSIONS passim (1949). If the
so-called Hector Memorandum, infra note 38, is considered a "reorganization study," it qualifies as a
recent example of renewed attack upon the independent agencies. The LANDs REPORT and the RaDFoRD
REPORT, infra note 78, do not so qualify, since neither seeks outright eliminatiof of the commissions.
"
5 See supra note 14.
8 BERNSTEIN, op. cit. supra note x8, at 151-52, 157-6o.
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effective administrative responsibility, and consistency and vigor in policy develop-
ment. As the authors of an important study of administrative regulation explained
the integrationist view in the 1930's X
•.. many of the most important problems of present-day economic life, such as the regula-
tion under law of transportation, communications, water power, finance, fuel, trade and
commerce, shipping, the tariff, securities and exchanges, labor relations, are given over
to independent and separate highly specialized authorities in respect to the entire field
of economic regulation.
Moreover,
• . . whereas the regulatory agencies are applying and developing broad economic and
social policies, they are removed from any effective political control comparable to that
exercised over other administrative agencies, which are also in some measure formulating
policy. The independent boards and commissions are not tied together in respect to
policy by the superior executive direction of the President of the United States, since
he can exercise very little control over them except through the power of appointment.
If the members of a commission are numerous, have staggered terms of office, possess a
long tenure, and can be removed only for cause, his control is almost negligible.
Similar points have again been cited in quite recent attacks upon the regulatory
commissions.88
The failure of the earlier attacks and the continued use of the commissions
today invite explanation. The reasons, already suggested in our earlier discussion
of presidential responsibility, illustrate rather well the obstacles to increased authority
for the President in regulatory administration. The most basic and underlying reason
relates to the political implications of executive integration. Administrative
relationships, say, of President to independent commissions or to bureaus within
executive departments, generally reflect existing power relations among participants
in the political process, including, in addition to the President and administrative
agencies themselves, Congress and relevant interest groups. In very practical terms,
proposals for executive integration contemplate not only a rearranging of the
somewhat technical administrative relationships within the executive branch of
government, but more fundamentally, a restructuring of the power relations of these
various participants. In other words, a re-ordering of administrative relationships
is the occasion for-in fact, is dependent upon-a re-ordering of political power
relationships3 9 This truism of reorganization politics helps explain the failure
of attempts to bring the independent regulatory agencies under control of the
President. For that failure reflects the President's inability to build sufficient
political power to overcome "the strength and vitality" of those relationships among
" BLAcHLY & OATmAN, op . cit. supra note 33, at 168-69. It should be said that the quotations in the
text above do not represent the views of the authors of the volume from which they are taken.
"Hector, Memorandum to the President: Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory
Commissions, 69 YAL L.J. 931 passim (ig6o) [this report has been published as a committee print by
the Senate Committee on Government Organization, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (5960)]. See also the LANDIS
REPoRT and the REDFoRD REPoRT, infra note 78.
" This idea is explained more fully in TuMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 432-33.
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independent agencies, their supporting interest groups, and the diffused elements
of leadership in the Congress that profit from a maintenance of the status quo.40
Such inability, in turn, is traceable to the pluralistic and dispersed character of
American politics and the consequent difficulty of generating that unity of political
power, in either the Presidency or the Congress, that the theory of executive integra-
tion requires.
Other reasons for the failure of executive integration have to do with assumptions
about the nature of regulation that supposedly distinguishes it from other types
of governmental endeavor and about the most effective and fair organizational
means for conducting the regulatory function. These assumptions are felt to justify
the existence of the independent regulatory commissions and have been influential
in the successful resistance to efforts to integrate the commissions into executive
departments of government.
Advocates of executive integration have difficulty in finding truly distinctive
characteristics in the substance of regulation that merit its administration by
independent commissions rather than by executive departments. Such is not
the case, of course, with partisans of regulation by commission. A somewhat
lengthy quotation from a study in the 193o's will show an attempt to state the
relevant distinctions:41
There is a clear line of demarcation between the types of economic situations con-
trolled by the Government departments and their subdivisions and those regulated by the
independent boards and commissions.
Broadly speaking, and with some exceptions, the Government departments and their
subdivisions are regulating and controlling business, through an exercise of what is
virtually the police power, in the interests of public health, safety, and the prevention of
fraud; whereas the independent boards and commissions are dealing with large economic
problems such as monopoly, unfair methods of competition, price discrimination, reason-
ableness of rates and services, preventing speculation, stabilizing industry, regulating
competing carriers in such a way as to guarantee adequate air, water, motor vehicle,
pipe line, and railway transportation systems, and regulating the relationships between
employers and employees. In the first type of regulation, the police formula of regulation
is largely applicable; that is, a fixed rule of law, a charge that the law has been broken,
and a decision. In the second type of regulation are involved questions of public policy,
questions of economic relationship, and problems of public management. The regulatory
process necessitates the development of more detailed lines of policy from rather general
legislative declarations and also the application of these more detailed policies to specific
cases.
Other observers describe the work of the regulatory commissions as concerned pri-
marily with supervising the economic integrity and development of particular
industries and with policing certain practices within business or industry as a
whole.42 In each instance, however, stress is placed upon the broad and discre-
'o The quoted words are Professor Truman's. Id. at 433.
" The Brookings Institution, Investigation of Executive Agencies of the Government, S. REP. No.
1275, 7 5 th Cong., ist Sess. 769-70 (937).
'Auas M. LANwis, THE ADmrws-TRTE PRocEss 23 (938).
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tionary nature of regulatory responsibility, coinciding with particular lines of busi-
ness, or with given industries, or, in some instances, with the entire economy.
For supporters of the regulatory commission, a consequence of such responsibility
is the necessity of establishing organs of government whose legal and technical
competence coincides with the realities of the industries or practices to be regulated
and whose methods of procedure meet the standards of fairness traditionally re-
quired of democratic government. The independent commission, it is felt, best
serves these needs. Why this is so was explained by the Hoover Commission task
force on regulatory agencies in terms of commission expertness, group decision-
making, continuity of policy, and impartiality.43  It found expertness in the
commissions derived from "fixed terms of reasonable duration, and the tradition
of reappointment," and from the aid rendered by older to newer members of the
agency. Group decisions and policy-making, characteristic of boards and commis-
sions and representing the "combined judgment" of several knowledgeable men,
provide "a barrier to arbitrary or capricious action and a source of decisions based
on different points of view and experience." Moreover, "group consultative action"
reduces the "likelihood of sudden change in policy.' Thus, continuity of policy,
further assured by long, staggered terms of office and by limits on the removal of
members, is another advantage of regulatory commissions, since it enables industrial
managers "to plan ahead" and adapt their private operations to the requirements of
public policy. And finally, the commission form of organization permits im-
partiality of regulation and freedom from political control. Again, this is possible
by virtue of group leadership and security of tenure, which permit resistance to "out-
side influence." "Moreover, since the activities of the commission may be more
subject to public scrutiny than would be a single bureau in a large department,
there is greater opportunity for exposure of pressures or improper actions." Then
too, "hearings and similar safeguards against arbitrary actions" may be more
effective when combined with group decision-making.
One further justification (and explanation) of the independent commission
relates to the necessity of unifying government's approach to the regulation of a
particular industry or business practice. Perhaps James M. Landis, in his early
and brilliant analysis of the regulatory process, explained best the character of this
need and the manner in which the new "administrative" agencies were designed to
satisfy it. According to Landis, "... the administrative [agency] differs not only
with regard to the scope of its powers; it differs most radically in regard to the
responsibility it possesses for their exercise. In the grant to it of that full ambit
of authority necessary for it to plan, to promote, and to police, it presents an
assemblage of rights normally exercisable by government as a whole."'44 Such unifica-
" COMmN ON ORGANIZATION OP THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH op THE GOVERNfENT, TAsK FORCE REPORT
ON REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 19-25 (1949). The quotation's in this paragraph of the text are taken
from the pages cited here.
"JAMsS M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 15 (1938).
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tion of powers and responsibility in the regulatory agency comports with, or indeed
is caused by, a similar unity in regulated industries :
As the governance of industry, bent upon the shaping of adequate policies and the
development of means for their execution, vests powers to this end without regard to the
creation of agencies theoretically independent of each other, so when government concerns
itself with the stability of an industry it is only intelligent realism for it to follow the
industrial rather than the political analogue. It vests the necessary powers with the
administrative authority it creates, not too greatly concerned with the traditional tripartite
theory of governmental organization. The dominant theme in the administrative structure
is thus determined not primarily by political conceptualism but rather by concern for an
industry whose economic health has become a responsibility of government.
Similar disregard of the "triadic contours" of organization and function derived from
the theory of separation of powers is evident also in those commissions responsible
for policing business practices rather than whole industries. 6  And although the
combination of various powers, methods, and instruments in a single commission
is regarded by some as a source of administrative unfairness,47 or a barrier to ade-
quate policy planning,4 or an impediment to government-wide coordination of
policies, 41 such a unified approach is strongly defended, as indicated above, as
necessary to the balanced and effective development of regulatory programs.
These various claims and assumptions regarding the nature of administrative
regulation and the qualities of regulatory commissions are said to justify in-
dependence from presidential control. No attempt will be made at this point to
evaluate these assumptions-that is, to question the alleged distinction between
executive-type and commission regulatory programs, either as to the substance of
such programs or methods and procedures employed, or between the relative capaci-
ties of departments and commissions for fairness and expertness in administration
of the law ° We need only acknowledge that regardless of the soundness of such
distinctions, these arguments in favor of independent commissions have appeared
sufficiently persuasive to account, in part at least, for the failure of the integrationist
movement in the national government.
More specifically, this failure is traceable to the inability of proponents of integra-
tion to offer alternative suggestions that appear capable of providing the benefits
allegedly arising from the commission form of organization, while at the same time
achieving the basic goals of executive integration. Or to state the matter differently,
the failure is revealed in the inability of integration proposals to provide acceptable
"Id. at 11-12.
'I ld. at 16.
tROBERT E. CUSHMIAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COmmISSIONS 700-01, 708 (941). The
American Bar Association's continuing plans to "remedy" this situation are mentioned elsewhere in this
symposium. Benjamin, A Lawyer's View of Administrative Procedure-The American Bar Assodation
Program, supra at 203.
"8 Hector, supra note 38, at 932.
"CusmtAN, op. ct. supra note 47, at 688.
coRedford's evaluation of the Hoover Commission task force's views on- the independent agencies
is pertinent here. EMMmE'rE S. REDFORD, ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTROL 286-87
(1952).
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answers to such basic questions as these: Which aspects of commission duties or
functions should come within the authority and responsibility of the President?
How is executive integration of regulatory administration to take place without, at
the same time, sacrificing (or appearing to sacrifice) those values of fairness and
impartiality of administration that the independent commissions supposedly assure?
How can the regulatory responsibilities of the President be increased and fairness
and impartiality of decision-making assured without, at the same time, so dis-
unifying the regulatory process as to render it less effective than it presently is?
Essentially, two related problems are involved in these questions: first, that of
providing government-wide direction and coordination of regulatory policies under
the President; second, that of assuring impartiality and objectivity of the judicial
functions in the context of such an integrated administration. And underlying
both problems is the issue of unified versus disunified administration of regulatory
programs on both the agency and government-wide levels.,'
Proponents of executive integration have sought answers to these questions-or
solutions to the underlying problems-largely in terms of separation of functions. 2
Viewing the independent commissions as serious obstacles to responsible policy
formation and coordination, they have proposed that the President (or departments
under his control) be given authority over those aspects of commission programs
that involve the determination of policy, in addition to such traditional executive-type
duties as investigations and law prosecution.53 But also acknowledging the need
and desirability of fairness in the judicial-like functions of the regulatory process,
they have advocated the creation of special, isolated bureaus within executive de-
partments54 or the establishment of administrative courts"' to carry out the judicial
duties now performed by commissions. In both instances, the rationale is that of
the separability of commission functions, and the recommended result, in addition
to doing away with the independent commissions, is the division of the currently
unified approach to regulation among two or more organs of government.
Such a result has not been acceptable, to date, to the Congress, the regulated
industries, or, of course, the commissions themselves. While the reasons for rejecting
these proposals are mixed, two factors about commission operations appear to have
had significant influence. One relates to the question of impartiality and fairness;
the other, to the unity of functions on the operating agency level, as mentioned
above. In the first instance, it is said that the internal separation of functions within
the agencies themselves, particularly as required by the Administrative Procedure
Act, largely solves the problem of unfairness that arises from the combination of
prosecuting and judging functions in the same hands."0 And in the second instance,
I ld. at 314-15, where reference is made to "a problem of unity at two levels."
52 PRESIDENT'S CoMm. ON ADmINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, op. cit. supra note 21, at 37-38. See also
CusHMAN, op. cit. supra note 47, at 708; Hector, supra note 38, at 96o, 962.
Hector, supra note 38, at 96o-6i.
' PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, Op. Cit. supra note 21, at 37.
55 Hector, supra note 38, at 962.
r The relevant provision of the Administrative Procedure Act is § 5(c). 6o Stat. 239 (946), 5 U.S.C.
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a strong case is offered to confirm the difficulty of separating the functions now
in the regulatory commissions and distributing them among different organs of
government. Moreover, the wisdom of such a separation is questioned in view of
the intimate relationship among the various administrative methods employed in
the over-all effort of an agency to accomplish its regulatory job. 57 For example,
proposals to distribute the policy-making and planning functions of the Civil
Aeronautics Board to an executive department and its adjudicatory function to a
"true administrative court" s are attacked as providing too facile an answer to the
interrelated problems of effectiveness and fairness of CAB route-certification pro-
ceedings. 9 For a decision as to which cities are to obtain new flight service, it
is said, may well depend upon which carriers are willing to provide it. The
intimate relationship between these two aspects of a single problem, therefore, makes
difficult the classification of one as "policy-making" and of the other as "policy-
application," and argues for the performance of both by the same administrative
agency. For this and related reasons, the necessity of a unified approach to single
regulatory programs has been successfully presented and has seemed of greater
importance than the unification or integration of all such programs under authority
of the President.
Ill
RaspoNsm =ur OF CONGRESS
Congress exercises its responsibility for the development and control of regulatory
policies in two basic ways: first, by legislation, which creates the substance of policies
and the organizational and procedural forms through which such policies are
administered, and provides the money necessary to their support; and second, by
§ 1004 (z958). Kenneth C. Davis's conclusion regarding the purpose and effect of this provision is as
follows: "The main idea of the APA-internal separation-has proved itself generally sound and workable.
Deficiencies of the APA provisions relate mostly to the refinements, especially the inapplicability of
the provisions to some functions that call for separation of functions." 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMIN-
ISrRATIVE LAw TRFATISE § 13.11 (958). For the majority views of the Attorney General's Committee
on Administrative Procedure, which helped to shape the provisions of § 5, see Attorney General's Comm.
on Administrative Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No. 8, 7 7 th
Cong., Ist Sess. 55 (i94)-
"A fairly typical, if perhaps somewhat prejudiced, expression of this viewpoint is found in the
following statement of the General Counsel of the CAB in reaction to the Hector Memorandum: "Just
as in theory the Board's functions are not and were not intended to be clearly segregated as policy-
making and adjudication or legislative and judicial but an amalgamation of both, so in actual fact and
practical application they are inseparable. The broad policy objectives and guidelines of the Act
permeate virtually every action and decision by the Board. In authorizing new routes or fixing mail rates,
for example, the Board is, of course, adjudicating in the sense that it is affecting private rights, but
it is doing so only as a part of a broader Congressional purpose and always with the general policy
objectives of the Act in mind. Adjudication is thus not an end in itself but a tool for proper effectuation
of the public interest." Detailed Analysis and Evaluation of the Hector Memorandum to the President
17 (i96o) [this may be found in Independent Regulatory Agencies Legislation, Hearings Before the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 465 (196o)].
" Hector, supra note 38, at 960-63.
"'Auerbach, Some Thoughts on the Hector Memorandum, 196o Wis. L. REv. 186 (196o).
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surveillance of the administration of regulatory programs. 0 In addition, the Senate
may influence the formulation of policies through its power to confirm or reject
presidential nominees to administrative positions. Ordinarily, the performance of
each of these functions is greatly influenced by the diversity of interests represented
by the membership of the Congress, the disintegrated character of its organization
and leadership, and the rules and traditions of its procedure, which, to a great extent,
naturally reflect the diversity and looseness of organization in the two houses."'
Although the increased size and complexity of regulatory programs have caused an
immense expansion of policy development by the President and administrative
agencies, Congress shows no disposition to relinquish its own basic controls.
In fact, the record of recent years indicates an increased involvement of Congress
in the details of regulatory administration. 2
A. Regulatory Legislation
It is the responsibility of Congress to declare by legislation the basic policy of
a regulatory program. No issue arises regarding its right to perform this function.
Rather, questions are directed to the effectiveness of its performance. Such ques-
tions as these reveal the really fundamental problems involved: Is the policy em-
bodied in the statute relatively clear? Are its goals specified? Are there clear
and consistent standards for guidance of the administrators? Has Congress resolved
certain basic issues inherent in the regulation intended, or has it passed an im-
possible task on to the regulatory agency? Is the policy realistically conceived and
adequate to meet the problems involved? Are administrators equipped with sanc-
tions sufficient to the tasks before them? Are statutory policies kept relatively up
to date in response to changing conditions and needs? Not all of these ques-
tions can be answered on the basis of "objective facts." Here, again, personal values
and biases of the observer will, of course, affect the answers. As a result, generally
mixed responses are given, for it is possible to pick illustrations that both confirm
and deny any general allegation that is made. On the whole, however-and that
may be just a convenient way of escape-it must be conceded that Congress too fre-
quendy has been deficient in the performance of these aspects of its policy-forming
job. Examples may be found in the Communications Act,0" where language de-
signed to regulate individual radio licensees provides only an indirect basis for control
of networks and reflects no real recognition of the newer television medium; or in
the Natural Gas Act," where the intention of Congress regarding Federal Power
60 Hyneman presents a realistic appraisal of the role of Congress. HYNEMAN, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 77-202. See also Heady & Linenthal, Congress and Administrative Regulation, supra at 238, 253-60.
'
1 TRttmAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 321-94. But see ERNEST S. GRIFFITH, CONGRESS, ITS CON-
TEMPORARY ROLE vii (1961).
e2 Schwartz, Legislative Control of Administrative Rules and Regulations: The American Experience,
30 N.Y.U.L. RaV. io31 (1955); Cotter & Smith, Administrative Accountability to Congress: The Con-
current Resolution, 9 W. Pot. Q. 955 (1956).
e48 Stat. IO64, 1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 307 (i958).
"52 Stat. 821, 823 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717, 717d (1958). See discussion of this problem in
CoRNF.Lius P. COTTER, GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 231-45 (1960).
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Commission jurisdiction over producer sales to interstate pipelines is, at best, cloudy;
or in the Transportation Act of i92o, where the standard governing railway rate-
making by the Interstate Commerce Commission ("annual . . . fair return upon
the aggregate value") was clearly inadequate to the task assigned.0 5
Yet a mild defense of the Congress must be offered, or at least a brief reminder
given of factors that, to some extent, explain these deficiencies in regulatory statutes.
In the first place, confusion or lack of clarity in regulatory goals and standards may
be but a reflection of the magnitude and complexity of the problem to be solved
or the industry to be regulated. The difficulty of reconciling the desire for "quality"
television programs with the right of free speech, or of deciding the relative weight
to be given to various criteria in assigning television channels, are illustrations.
66
Or confusion in statutes may result from uncertainty about methods to achieve
ambiguous but nonetheless desired goals. Trade regulation to maintain a "free
competitive enterprise system" is an appropriate example.
67
Secondly, at times, complaints about lack of clarity in statutes are but indications
of disagreement with regulatory goals and represent attempts to avoid forceful
regulation. Or, as a variation of this point, complaints not infrequently reflect
dissatisfaction with what is considered weakness in regulatory legislation. No small
part of the criticism of regulation by independent commissions, it seems, is traceable
to this factor.68 There obviously are differences among men on the fundamental
questions of what should be regulated and what should not, and concerning how
forceful regulation, once initiated, should be. But it is well to remember that
Americans, while not at all reluctant to use governmental power to achieve desired
results, have generally eschewed the "comprehensive" approach toward regulation
and have been content to proceed cautiously and on a piecemeal basis. There
has been a willingness, to use the term of Professor Lindblom, to "muddle
through."6 Such an approach may not satisfy some of us, but it is essentially the
one expected of Congress as it formulates regulatory policies. And Congress should
not be condemned on grounds of lack of clarity in statutory policies when those
policies are relatively clear, but not forceful enough to satisfy a given observer.
A fourth factor concerns the relationship between clarity of regulatory purpose
and specificity of statutory provisions, between the need of sufficiently detailed di-
rections by the Congress and the probably more compelling need of breadth and
generality in statutory policy statements.70 These relationships pose something
a41 Stat. 456, 488 (1926). Cited and discussed in EMMET r S. REDoRD, ADMiwisrAT oN OF
NATIONAL EcoNoMIsc CONTROL 69-70 (1952).
" The free speech issue arises not only because of the constitutional guarantee, but also, and more
immediately, because of § 326 of the Communications Act, which forbids the FCC to interfere with that
freedom. 48 Stat. 1o (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1958).
17 Reference here, of course, is to such a statutory expression of "competitive enterprise" policy as
§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
" Jaffe, The Independent Agency-A New Scapegoat, 65 YAa L.J. io68 (1956).
"
9 Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 79 (1959).
" Redford provides a good discussion of these and related factors as they affect administrative pro-
gram development. EMzi-rE S. REDFORD, ADMINISTRATON OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTROL 57-64
(1952).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
of a dilemma for the Congress, as well as for the administrator. On the one hand,
it is obvious that clarity in regulatory goals flows from specificity and detail in
legislation. But on the other, too much detail can cripple imaginative and flexible
administration of the law, especially in response to changing conditions. How then,
for example, does the language of section five of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, with its prohibition of "unfair methods of competition," measure up under
each of these contending needs?71 Such ambiguity in the definition of proscribed
business practices may well be the price that must be paid for a sufficiently flexible
adjustment of the law by administration to certain emerging business methods.
Regardless of the conclusion in this or any other example, however, the point
to be remembered is that congressmen and legislative draftsmen are not always
oblivious of such considerations, and ordinarily attempt to reconcile in a reasonable
manner these conflicting requirements.
Finally, the effect of the composition, organization, and leadership of Congress
upon its policy-forming role should be recalled. The diverse and disintegrated
character of the legislature is the source of much confusion and ineffectiveness in
regulatory statutes. Diversity and independence of membership and organization
place a premium upon compromise, and compromise can at times produce in-
consistent, confused standards or goals in legislation. Interested outside parties,
permitted "access" and "influence" by the organization and methods of Congress,
are not averse to introducing confusion into regulatory laws. 2  Much or all of
this is to be deplored, perhaps. But in evaluating Congress' responsibility in policy
development, there is no harm in remembering what students in introductory
courses in American government are rightly told-that the inconsistencies and
confusions emanating from the national legislature are in no small way the result
of the inconsistencies and confusions in the country at large.
B. Surveillance of Administration
It is also the responsibility of Congress to review the administration of laws it
enacts. In performing this task, it inevitably attempts to influence or shape the
content of regulatory policies. This is both a legitimate and necessary function of
Congress, but one that is difficult of adequate performance and is easily abused.
The methods and occasions of congressional review of regulatory policies are many
and varied and well-known to all. Through its committees on appropriations, legisla-
tive and special investigating committees, as well as through individual congressmen,
particularly, committee chairmen, and key staff personnel, Congress possesses in-
numerable agents of "legislative oversight" of regulatory policies. The quality and
effectiveness of such oversight are uneven, however; and the resulting influence of
Congress upon regulatory policies is, therefore, varied. In some instances, its
influence produces administrative adherence to policies originally intended by Con-
gress or assists in the legitimate and flexible adjustment of existing law to new
1 x38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (958).
2 Tkum.t.r, op. cit. supra note 2, at 352-61. But see Gmrmm, op. cit. supra note 6x, at 151.
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and unanticipated conditions.13 On other occasions, however, its influence results
in an enlarging or narrowing of statutory policies to accord with views of individual
interests, congressmen, or committees."4
The character of Congress' influence, of course, is immediately determined by
the interest, judgment, and wisdom of its reviewing agents, and by the resulting
quality and intensity of the review. 3 Accordingly, the results are mixed" Fo
as would be expected among dozens of members and several committees directly
concerned with regulatory policies, there is great variation in those factors that
determine the quality of legislative oversight. In many cases, the approach to
administration is guided by intelligence, understanding, and reserve. The competent
members who are found on each committee, as well as experienced and resourceful
staff personnel who assist them, provide vigorous, but balanced, surveillance of the
development of particular regulatory programs. In a political system where power
is divided and at times widely dispersed, responsible and effective government is
achieved through the efforts of such men.
But not all conditions in Congress are so favorable for effective review. The
very intensity and frequency of congressional oversight, which can be a basis of
legitimate control of administration, may also disrupt and demoralize admin-
istrative efforts. Carried to an extreme, as it sometimes is, it can substitute
congressional direction for the leadership and responsibility of agency officials.""
Then too, the approach of congressional review is too frequently narrow and par-
ticularistic, concentrating upon a single problem or limited range of problems at
a given time. Such an approach may be conducive to thoroughness of review,
but it also makes difficult the achievement of broad understanding necessary to
more balanced programs of government. Related to this condition is the practice
of according to semi-independent units (committees, chairmen) authority to speak
for the whole of Congress on policy matters. This practice, again, is productive
of expertness on administrative programs and, on the whole, is an indispensable
attribute of the national legislature. But it can also be the basis for usurping
administrative authority in decision-making and for twisting statutory policies to
accord with the particular interest of a powerful member or committee of Congress.
And finally, there is weakness in legislative oversight in the noticeable failure of
Congress to maintain sustained or reasonably continuous review of administrative
policy development. Such failure, of course, is related in part to inadequacy
" Note the comments to this effect in the "panel discussion" type of hearings on the regulatory
process held by the Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight in 1958. The panel was composed of admin-
istrative practitioners, agency members, and legal scholars, all of whom were concerned with the regula-
tory process. Hearings, supra note 15, at 102-05.
", James M. Landis cites, as an example, the role of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce in "setting aside" the FCC's program for subscription television. Id. at 98.
" Attention should be called to the efforts made by Congress in 1946 to reorganize itself and improve
its methods of operation, including its methods of surveillance of administration. See, in this regard,
GEORO B. GALLOWAY, CONGRESS AT THE CROSSROADS 230 (1946).
" See note 73 supra.
7 See note 74 supra.
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of time and personnel to undertake the difficult and ofttimes tedious jobs of review.
But to some degree, it is also caused by the discontinuity in the sessions of Con-
gress, changes in congressional composition and leadership, and the narrow political
environment in which review is frequently undertaken.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
President and Congress share responsibility for the regulatory process. Neither
can claim exclusive interest or authority in the statutory formulation or subsequent
administration of regulatory programs. The actual role of each and their relationship
in the regulatory process is determined not in any permanently fixed or precise
manner, but rather from time to time and from policy to policy by the movement
of political forces and the realities of institutional characteristics that shape these
branches of government. Within these relative limits, however, the functions of
each are fairly clearly defined. In the case of the President, responsibility consists
primarily of the formulation of policies for consideration of the Congress and the
manipulation of political means for achieving their enactment into law. In this
respect, the President, acting as the agent of reformist groups less effectively repre-
sented in the Congress, has achieved significant innovations in regulatory policy.
His role in the development of administrative programs, however, is much less
extensive, the independence of regulatory agencies and their use of a judicial,
case-by-case approach for policy formation being the most apparent reasons.
Congress, through enactment of regulatory statutes, control of programs through
appropriations, and surveillance of administration, exercises its share of responsibility
for the regulatory process. The quality of its performance in these respects varies
greatly, however, particularly because the dispersed nature of its leadership and
political composition makes difficult the achievement of sustained and consistent
attention to regulatory programs. The independent commissions, considered by
legislators as "arms of the Congress," contribute materially to Congress' ability
to involve itself in the minutia of administrative regulation, but also demonstrate
its corresponding inability to provide the type of leadership that administration of
complex programs requires.
There has been a noticeable failure of efforts to integrate the regulatory com-
missions into executive departments under control of the President. Such efforts, in
addition to clarifying important issues concerning the unity of the regulatory process
and of administrative fairness, reveal the underlying political relationships of par-
ticipants in the regulatory process. Failure of executive integration, therefore,
demonstrates the relative weakness of groups supporting greater authority in the
President, as compared with opposing groups and interests with better political
access to the Congress.
Because joint presidential-congressional responsibility for the regulatory process
is a fact of American governmental life, it does not follow that the results for effective
policy development are in all respects satisfactory. It does mean, however, that
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attempts to remedy whatever inadequacies may be present will have to proceed, for
the most part, in recognition of that fact of shared responsibility. The problem
of achieving greater consistency and vigor in the administration of certain regula-
tory policies, and in their relations to other areas of governmental policy, is a case
in point. No amount of wishful thinking or special pleading can remove the
necessity of government's providing a better coordinated, more vigorous approach
toward the problems of transportation in this country. Other observers find com-
pelling need for similar improvements in the areas of communications, trade prac-
tices, and power resources regulation.78 There are those, of course, who deny that
such problems exist, or if acknowledging their existence, contend that Congress
is capable of remedying them, by either improving the quality of its statutes or
perfecting the character of its legislative surveillance, or both7 Conversely, others
continue to find a solution in drastic proposals for executive integration, with con-
sequent dismemberment of the independent agencies and distribution of their
functions to executive departments and specialized administrative courtsf0 Neither
of these solutions, however, will do: the former, because it provides no basis for
the kind of direction that complex administration requires; the latter, since, at this
juncture of our government's development, it is politically incapable of fulfillment,
and also because it fails to provide an acceptable adjustment between the conflicting
needs of a unified approach to individual regulatory programs and of procedural
fairness.
It is, therefore, understandable-and appropriate-that other recent proposals
for remedying the problems of coordination and planning have revealed more
cautious and eclectic-and consequently, more realistic-approaches. The Landis
and Redford reports are of this type 1 For example, the Landis report, assuming
the necessity and wisdom of retaining existing regulatory agencies, proposed the
creation within the Executive Office of the President of special offices for the
coordination and development of policies in the areas of transportation, energy, and
communications. These offices ". . . would need no regulatory powers,"82 but
would serve as high-level staffs to the President for the study and development of
policy recommendations in their respective fields, and as representatives of the
President in contacts with the regulatory agencies and executive departments for
the purpose of promoting cooperation and coordination in policy formation. Al-
though there may be reason for questioning the ability of such offices to function
as effectively as anticipated, particularly in view of their divorcement from admin-
istrative operations where the materials and staffs for adequate planning are found,
"'LANDIS REPORT 24, 74; EmhEIrr S. REFoRD, TAE PRESIDENT AND THE REGULATORY COMMIS-
SIONS i, 6-8 (196o) (prepared by Professor Redford in his capacity of consultant to the President's Ad-
visory Committee on Government Organization) [elsewhere cited as REDroRD REPORT].
7'An early expression of this view is found in studies and reports prepared by The Brookings
Institution in the late X930's. See, BLACHLY & OATMAN, op. dt. supra note 33, at 168-82. A more
recent example appears in the CAB memorandum on the Hector proposals, supra note 57, at 29-34.
"o Hector, supra note 38, at 96o-64.
o' Op. cit. supra notes x7, 78.
"LnmDis REPORT 77.
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the frankly empirical nature of the proposal has much to commend it.,, Not only
does it provide a more formal (although, perhaps, inadequate) means for presidential
recognition of, and attention to, the needs of regulatory policy development, but,
by minimizing opposition of Congress, and clientele groups through avoidance of
drastic reorganization plans, it accomplishes that goal in the only manner that our
political system currently allows. As a result, with adequate personal support
of the President, the arrangement may enable immediate attention to be given to
significant problems of regulatory policy formation, while, at the same time, ex-
perience is gained and a basis is developed for possibly more permanent and
adequate organizational methods.
Similarly, the report of Professor Redford avoids the extreme reorganization
proposals traditionally associated with executive integration and acknowledges the
need of accommodating the requirements of better overhead policy direction in the
President to existing operations in regulatory commissions8 4 In that way, it, too,
seeks solutions to a serious issue now confronting the regulatory process, but in a
manner that provides some possibility of success.
Id. at 76-77.
8 Note, for example, the following quotation from this report: "Some authorities have suggested
that executive responsibility can only be safeguarded if the executive and policy-making functions of
commissions are transferred to executive departments and their quasi-judicial functions placed in: com-
pletely independent agencies. This solution is drastic and is based on the doubtful assumption that the
regulatory scrambled egg can be cleanly separated into an' executive-policy determining yellow and a
quasi-judicial white. The same objective may be attained through providing the President with means
through which he can give policy guidance to the commissions for their day-to-day activities." REoORD
REPORT 2. The necessary "means" of presidential leadership are set forth in id. at 3-5.
